bargaining and markets complexity competitive outcome 5 pptx

... satisfies IR and IC, then from (5. 1) and (5. 2) we have U M (s 1 ) ≥ (s 2 −s 1 )/2 and U M (b 2 ) ≥ (b 2 −b 1 )/2. Now, since the seller has reservation value s 1 with probability 1/2, and the buyer ... of this literature is given in Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (19 85) . 108 Chapter 5. Bargaining between Incompletely Informed Players Definition 5. 5 The beliefs of Player 1 are...

Ngày tải lên: 21/06/2014, 09:20

... period t. S and B stand for the seller and the buyer, and Y and N stand for acceptance and rejection. The numbers beside the branches are the probabilities with which the branches occur. and seller ... → D S p ∗ p                                ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ ❅ Figure 7.3 Demand and supply curves i...

Ngày tải lên: 21/06/2014, 09:20

... to the first model and study in de- tail the role of the informational assumptions in leading to a competitive outcome. 151 154 Chapter 8. A Market with One-Time Entry partners, and thus find the ... models of Binmore and Herrero (1988a) and Gale (1987, Section 5) , although the exact form of Prop os ition 8.2 appears in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990). The model of Section 8.4...

Ngày tải lên: 21/06/2014, 09:20

... it and depart from the market. 9 .5 A Model with More General Contracts and Resale 1 85 We see that in a model in which the seller chooses whether or not to terminate bargaining with one buyer and ... equilibria and competitive outcomes. As back- ground for the analysis, recall that the models of Chapters 6 (Model B) and 8, in which all agents enter the market at once, yield...

Ngày tải lên: 21/06/2014, 09:20

... Theory”, Econometrica 59 , 909–924. [ 65, 156 ] Rubinstein, A., and A. Wolinsky (19 85) , “Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining , Econometrica 53 , 1133–1 150 . [136, 147] Rubinstein, A., and A. Wolinsky ... 77– 1 05 in Binmore and Dasgupta (1987). [54 , 66] Binmore, K. G. (1987c), “Nash Bargaining and Incomplete Information”, pp. 155 –192 in Binmore and Dasgupta...

Ngày tải lên: 21/06/2014, 09:20

... how it was; everybody says that he is eat up with pride, and I dare say he had heard somehow that Mrs. Long does not keep a carriage, and had come to the ball in a hack chaise.’ ‘I do not mind ... Mrs. Long,’ said Miss Lucas, ‘but I wish he had danced with Eliza.’ Pride and Prejudice Jane Austen Chapter 5 Within a short walk of Longbourn lived a family with whom the Bennets...

Ngày tải lên: 21/01/2014, 18:20

Ngày tải lên: 23/03/2014, 22:20

... Introduction 91 5. 2 A Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers 92 5. 3 Sequential Equilibrium 95 5.4 Delay in Reaching Agreement 104 5. 5 A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium 107 5. 6 Mechanism Design ... in this case. Haller (1991), Haller and Holden (1990), and Fernandez and Glazer (1991) (see also Jones and McKenna (1988)) study a situation in which a firm and a union bargain...

Ngày tải lên: 08/04/2014, 12:15

... weaken assumption A5 and require only that Player 1’s preference between the outcomes (x, t) and (y, t + 1) when t is odd is independent of t, and Player 2’s preference between (x, t) and (y, t + 1) ... 2.1 A bargaining problem is a pair S, d, where S ⊂ R 2 is com- pact (i.e. closed and bounded) and convex, d ∈ S, and there exists s ∈ S such that s i > d i for i = 1, 2. T...

Ngày tải lên: 08/04/2014, 12:30

... view. 5. 3 RESULTS 5. 3.1 p r o b l e m si t u A t i o n s 5. 3.1.1 Drainage and Access Road Problems in Kiawamagira During the rainy season and every time it rained for a few hours, most of the land ... 7: 51 54 . Flood, R.L., and Carson, E.R. (1993). Dealing with Complexity: An Introduction to the The- ory and Application of Systems Science. New York: Plenum Press. Ison, R.L.,...

Ngày tải lên: 18/06/2014, 19:20