bargaining and markets complexity competitive outcome 4 pptx

... strategy sets of the different types of buyer, and of seller, are the same, and the outcome of bargaining is a function only of the strategies used by the seller and the buyer. Any function that selects a ... satisfies IR and IC, then from (5.1) and (5.2) we have U M (s 1 ) ≥ (s 2 −s 1 )/2 and U M (b 2 ) ≥ (b 2 −b 1 )/2. Now, since the seller has reservation value s 1 with proba...

Ngày tải lên: 21/06/2014, 09:20

... period t. S and B stand for the seller and the buyer, and Y and N stand for acceptance and rejection. The numbers beside the branches are the probabilities with which the branches occur. and seller ... this game and the game analyzed in Section 4. 2: the proposer is chosen randomly at the start of every period, and the outcome in the event of breakdown is not necessarily th...

Ngày tải lên: 21/06/2014, 09:20

... such agent has a nonzero excess demand), and the probability of such an event is one. 8.8 Market Equilibrium and Competitive Equilibrium Prop os itions 8.2 and 8 .4 show that the noncooperative models ... models of Binmore and Herrero (1988a) and Gale (1987, Section 5), although the exact form of Prop os ition 8.2 appears in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990). The model of Section...

Ngày tải lên: 21/06/2014, 09:20

... equilibria and competitive outcomes. As back- ground for the analysis, recall that the models of Chapters 6 (Model B) and 8, in which all agents enter the market at once, yield competitive outcomes. There ... of Bin- more (1985) and Wilson (19 84) . The first model in Section 9 .4 is due to Binmore (1985) and Wilson (19 84) ; the second model is closely related to a model in Shake...

Ngày tải lên: 21/06/2014, 09:20

... preferences, 34 strategy, 37–39, 38 as automaton, 39 41 stationarity, 39, 46 subgame, 44 subgame perfect equilibrium, 43 – 54 characterization, 45 , 83 with constant cost of delay, 49 , 93 with constant ... [27] Hendon, E., and T. Tranæs (1991), “Sequential Bargaining in a Market with One Seller and Two Different Buyers’, Games and Economic Behavior 3, 45 3 46 6. [187] Herre...

Ngày tải lên: 21/06/2014, 09:20

... okay to run a pilot and just never stopped. Their bosses just let them do it. It is indeed easier to get forgiveness than permission. 10589$ $CH2 02-23- 04 16 :44 :18 PS 24 Golf and the Game of Leadership A ... Leadership Game Real leaders typically understand and model the following in their day-to-day actions: ■ LEAD BY EXAMPLE: Simple, yet difficult 10589$ $CH2 02-23- 04 16 :44...

Ngày tải lên: 24/12/2013, 16:15

... evaluate the candi- date and to “sell” your organization. During the body of the inter- view, you need to assess the candidate’s qualifications, skills, knowl- edge, and experience and compare ... you and demonstrate your interest and your preparation. Good questions include: • Self-appraisal questions that require the candidate to give some thought to his or her interpersonal skill...

Ngày tải lên: 26/01/2014, 17:20

Ngày tải lên: 23/03/2014, 22:20

... Structure of Bargaining 30 3.3 Preferences 32 3 .4 Strategies 37 3.5 Strategies as Automata 39 3.6 Nash Equilibrium 41 3.7 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 43 3.8 The Main Result 44 3.9 Examples 49 3.10 ... Introduction 69 4. 2 A Model of Alternating Offers with a Risk of Breakdown 71 4. 3 A Model of Simultaneous Offers: Nash’s “Demand Game” 76 4. 4 Time Preference 81 4. 5 A Model wit...

Ngày tải lên: 08/04/2014, 12:15

... olution and Theorem 3 .4 to the game Γ(q). B1 (Pie is desirable) For any x ∈ X and y ∈ X we have x  i y if and only if x i > y i , for i = 1, 2. B2 (Breakdown is the worst outcome) (0, 1) ∼ 1 B and ... to conclude, and (iii) no agreement may be imposed on any individual without his approval. A bargaining theory is an exploration of the relation between the outcome of barg...

Ngày tải lên: 08/04/2014, 12:30