Security at sea

THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE SECURITY AT SEA By Brigadier (Retd) B A H Parritt, CBE International Maritime Security (IMS) Foreword by Mr W A O'Neil, Secretary General The International Maritime Organization This book is dedicated to CAPTAIN E E MITROPOULOS and CAPTAIN J L THOMPSON Two officers of the International Maritime Organization whose contribution to security at sea has made life so much safer for so many passengers and crew SECURITY AT SEA ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Author wishes to thank the following for their patience and help in the preparation of this book: First, my colleagues in International Maritime Security, Mr T L Davies, Mr R G T Raikes, Mr R J Stuchbury who distilled a security policy for ships into practical solutions I would also like to thank Dr Paulo Cavanna for his wise advice and Mr Francesco Sicardi for the details of the insurance claims of the Achille Lauro Professional help was supplied by Commander Don Goldstein, US Coast Guard, and Mr Michael Chapman and Mr Fred Lake of the Ministry of Defence Library I am particulary grateful to Captain 'Thimio' Mitropoulos and Captain John Thompson of the IMO Their contribution to the protection of all those who travel by sea has been outstanding I am also particularly grateful to Mr Mike Ridler of the UK Department of Transport whose individual contribution in the creation of the UK Aviation & Maritime Security Act has been a most successful and significant achievement Finally may I thank Mr Julian Parker of The Nautical Institute for his positive support, and the two IMS secretaries, Sue Foster and Biddy Boucher THE NAUTICALINSTITUTE SECURITY AT SEA CONTENTS Chapter One Chapter Two Chapter Three Chapter Four Chapter Five Chapter Six Chapter Seven Chapter Eight Chapter Nine Chapter Ten Chapter Eleven Acknowledgements Foreword The Impact of Terrorism on Passenger Ships Maritime Terrorist Acts Factors in DeCiding the Appropriate Level of Protection The International Maritime Organization's 'Guidelines to Prevent Illegal Acts at Sea' and Subsequent Legislation Practical Measures to Improve Maritime Security Contingency Plans Action to be Taken if the Ship is Taken Over by Force Anti Drug Smuggling Protection Measures Security Measures to be Taken if Entering Hostile Waters Piracy Letter or Parcel Bombs Annexes The International Maritime Organization Maritime Safety Committee Approved Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers and Crew on Board Ships The United States 1986 Ports and Maritime Security Act Directions Under the UK Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 Threat Assessment Guidelines for Ships Visiting the UK January 1991 Sea Carrier Security Manual Drug Smuggling in Containers, Trailers and Chassis Specimen International Maritime Security (IMS) Ship Security Plan Contents List Searching Procedures in Ports and on Ships Index Page 13 19 22 27 33 36 38 44 51 55 56 72 78 84 89 95 99 103 SECURITYAT SEA AA Navigating officer on board the Seabourn Pride He is 'carrying an explosive vapour detector and has easy access to his hand-held metal detector, radio, visitors log and crew card board THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE FOREWORD W A O'Neil Secretary-General, International Maritime Organization MERCHANT SHIPPING provides an invaluable service to society transporting goods and commodities across the world However, the marine environment can be inhospitable, subjecting mariners to storms, fog, ice and heat The commercial climate is also highly competitive and there are strong pressures to cut costs in order to survive It is difficult enough to operate ships today without further distractions, but insidiously a new threat has to be recognised and dealt with Perhaps it is no accident that reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships have been growing whilst the industry struggles to become profitable No location is absolutely free from this threat, and merchant ships carrying out their lawful business often with a minimum of crew on board are targets for those who seek to achieve their ends through the illicit practice of terrorism, piracy or drugs contraband The multi-national facilities for registering, financing and manning ships diffuses governmental involvement, whilst the freedom of the high seas makes it legally difficult to mount international maritime security and surveillance Self-help is, of course, the most obvious response to a perceived threat, but how should this be organised? During the first world war there was considerable debate about the desirability or otherwise of convoying ships under escort However, statistics soon showed the value of the system and that ships could be better protected and more effective use could be made of escorts using the convoy system When an attack did get through there was also a better chance of detecting and sinking enemy submarines So with security, there are ways of assessing threat and using the ship's resources to best advantage The great value of this practical book is that it demonstrates what can be done It is therefore invaluable to ship managers and seamen whose lives, heaven forbid, may depend on the good advice it gives Of course, action taken by ships alone cannot solve the problem of terrorism or piracy; this requires concerted diplomatic action and in some cases strong police or military intervention may be necessary Let us not forget, these are acts of violence against innocent people and they have to be dealt with firmly The International Maritime Organization has played a major role in co-ordinating the international response to terrorism The guidelines drawn up by a small group of experts were unanimously agreed to by the Maritime Safety Committee and the maritime industry now has valuable guidance on what each party, whether flag State, port State, shipowner or shipmaster, should in the event of a terrorist attack The IMO guidelines break with the tradition of established legislation in that they require accountability of officers and managers with respect to the security of passengers and crew and they cause companies to formulate plans for positive response The whole process is well discussed in this book and reflects great credit on mypredecessor, Mr C P Srivastava, and IMO team who helped to formulate the recommendations Piracy is still a major problem and ranges from petty theft in port to armed assault directed towards the capture of a ship, her cargo or the valuables from the master's safe IMO is continually monitoring the incidence of piracy incidents so as to provide warning about trouble spots The IMO is also using its influence to apply diplomatic pressure to convince governments that piracy, armed robbery or other unlawful acts against ships occurring in their ports or adjacent territorial waters must be brought under control and eradicated It is, however, necessary to be realistic A well-organised police force does not prevent violent crime in cities An effective crime prevention force will, however, contain risk to within reasonable levels In certain areas even the forces for law and order may be part of the organised gangs who prey on merchant ships IMOthrough its monitoring activities can help to identify those areas where the worst crimes are being committed If ships must trade to these areas we would recommend that it would be prudent for them to take extra security precautions Security, from burglar alarms on houses to special locks on the doors of ships' bridges, is sadly a growing and increasingly uncomfortable part of life It cannot and should not be ignored This book fulfils an important role in creating a realistic sense of awareness Society and all concerned with maritime affairs owe the seamen a better epitaph than 'the loneliness of command ' CHAPTER ONE THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON PASSENGER SHIPS The murder of one old crippled man in 1985 during the hi-jacking of the Achille Lauro caused the cruise industry in the Mediterranean to come to a total and abrupt halt Passenger ships found themselves either anchored indefinitely off Piraeus, or joining a queue of fifteen others trying to get a berth in St Thomas in the US Virgin Islands The official Greek Government figures following this single murder revealed a direct loss of $US300 million; $200 million from tourism and $100 million from cancelled cruise ship bookings This enormous impact on the maritime industry was not caused by large scale mayhem and bloodshed, but by the actions of four men carrying out a terrorist attack At the height of the Gulf War in 1991, when the military might of the coalition forces were devastating Iraqi forces with battleships and bombers, people of all nationalities stopped travelling Flights were cancelled, cruise ship bookings fell dramatically, and ferries throughout Scandinavia and the Mediterranean were laid up to reduce costs The reason for this immediate and devastating impact on the passenger industry, was not the fear of Iraqi tanks, missiles or poison gas, but the fear of perhaps five or six men or women carrying out a terrorist attack Every day in New York City there are over one hundred violent deaths, yet many murders hardly get a mention in the newspapers In 1989 however, when a group of insignificant men in a backstreet in Beirut murdered Colonel Higgins, an American, the President of the United States, who is the most powerful man in the world, turned his aircraft around and returned to Washington to 'deal with the crisis.' Cruise bookings fell immediately and seamen lost their jobs There can be no doubt therefore that acts of terrorism have a great impact on the passenger industry and passenger ship profitability Deciding what a passenger ship company should to avoid potential acts of terrorism, or what a passenger ship should to prevent acts of terrorism, is nevertheless a complicated issue Providing protection from acts of violence is the natural function of a military ship, but it is a very unnatural function for a ship designed to provide relaxed holidays or fast ferry travel It is also relevant that whilst passenger ships have been the main focus for terrorist activity, threats have been made against offshore installations The Gulf War demonstrated a new and unacceptable threat which was to discharge oil from tankers and shore side tank farms into the Arabian Gulf as a form of environmental terrorism The nature of terrorism Why is it that this technique called 'terrorism'has had such an impact on maritime life? Why is it that this tactic can have such an immediate and drastic effect on profitability and the level of crew redundancy? The answer lies in the unique nature of terrorism as opposed to other acts of violence Terrorism is a criminal act, yet the world seems to have accepted that a terrorist crime somehow obscures guilt A man who murders his neighbour, or blinds a woman in a robbery, is clearly seen to be a criminal But if he does the same thing while alleging that it is for political, religious or even ecological reasons, then it seems to create the illusion that he is not really a criminal and there may even be some justification for his wickedness The excuse given, is that terrorism is an act carried out for a 'Cause' rather than for personal gain, and that in pursuit of this non-financial 'Cause,' the participants are special because they are risking their lives for a motive unconnected with monetary profit This combination of 'Cause' and apparent self sacrifice, is not in itself sufficient to achieve the aim of seizing the attention of the whole world It needs other elementsinnocent victims-horror-and of crucial importance-good communications If there were no media coverage there would be no terrorism SECURITY AT SEA Some cruise ships employ 10 local people to help security THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE It is by using this combined formula of Cause, innocence, horror and communications that we have arrived at a situation whereby a very small number of men or women armed with a limited amount of weapons or explosive can immediately capture world-wide interest Eight million people were made aware of the Palestinian problem following the massacre of the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972 where the media of the world were concentrated and available to give intense coverage of the tragedy It would be foolhardy to expect therefore that this uniquely powerful and often successful tactic will not continue to be used by a growing variety of people who feel abnormally strongly about their own particular convictions and want to gain world-wide publicity Acts of terrorism are not going to stop Terrorism is with us for ever, and must be dealt with in a routine and undramatic manner This also applies to the maritime industry Maritime terrorism Fortunately, although there have been many maritime acts of criminality and piracy and these are increasing in number and brutality, apart from the sinking of a Greek cruise liner which blew up in 1973 after hitting a mine placed by the Black September Terrorist Organisation in Beirut, there have only been three major acts of terrorism at sea-the Santa Maria in 1962, the Achille Lauro in 1985 and the City of Poras in 1989 We will look at these three attacks in some detail, but it is interesting to note that none of them achieved the practical results originally intended by the perpetrators All three were militarily incompetent and 'professional' failures However all three did achieve vast and continuing world-wide publicity, which is not surprising because the sea provides the perfect setting for a terrorist drama Sailing has always been glamorous and exciting but passengers travelling by sea often feel vulnerable; after leaving home they feel they have lost a degree of their sovereignty and are in other people's hands, certainly they feel at the mercy of the elements We thus have the ideal ingredients for a terrorist attack; an exciting and potentially hazardous situation, innocent people in a vulnerable position, and excellent communications For the past decade, with the exception of internecine terrorist operations, e.g the IRA in Ireland, the Basques in Spain and the Tamils in Sri Lanka, Americans and American interests have been the most attractive terrorist target Given the volatile situation in the Middle East, American travellers will continue to be at risk For a terrorist selecting his target, there is attacking wealthy rather than poor victims, and of faith are sadly the most vulnerable A cruise ship or large numbers of rich American Jews must therefore a proven psychological benefit in all peoples, members of the Jewish ferry which is known to be carrying be placed in a higher risk category But it is important to keep this in perspective The actual risk is low There is far more likelihood of a ship having to use its inert gas system to quench an engine-room fire, or launch its lifeboats after a collision, than in having to deal with a terrorist incident No passenger should ever decide against travelling by sea on the unsubstantiated feeling that a terrorist attack might occur The conclusion must be that acts of terrorism are going to continue, and the maritime industry, like every other transportation industry, will continue to be affected The risk of attack is low, but it is now a fact of maritime life that the shipping industry has to take sensible measures to reassure travellers and crews that proper steps are being taken to protect them Just as inert gases and lifeboats are routine and undramatic features of every ship, so security measures must in the same way become similar, non-controversial, totally unexciting, features of every ship's design and management SECURITY AT SEA 11 Figure SECURITY AT SEA 91 False Ceilings The construction of the false ceiling can either be internal or external The external false ceiling, or false roof, can be detected by observing the distance between the top of the corner block and the top of the roof Normally, the roof is slightly below or flush with the top of the corner blocks If the roof is above the corner blocks, then a false roof may exist An internally constructed false ceiling can be detected by reaching for the ceiling When a false ceiling or floor exists, a change in height or in the ability to touch the roof should be noticed Other telltale signs may also be present, such as fresh paint, obscured corner blocks, welding burns, and the like Container Frames The most difficult method to detect is the use of container frames to conceal drugs (figure 4) Without other telltale signs, detection is normally possible only by drilling the frame and probing Refrigerated Containers The interior of a reefer container offers more places to conceal drugs than any other type of container or trailer The interior walls, ceiling, and doors are separated from their exterior counterparts by four to six inches of insulation At the front of a reefer, a baffle wall separates the refrigeration unit from the cargo, creating a space for air circulation The size of this wall and the distance from the motor may vary Usually it starts eight to 10 inches from the floor and ends eight to 10 inches from the ceiling Some of these walls are hinged in the centre and can be pulled down for inspection by simply removing a few screws Others can be removed only with great difficulty Protruding through a cut-out section of the baffle wall is the interior section of the blower duct From this duct, a plastic or canvas tubing system runs the length of the container to distribute the cold refrigerated air A false front wall may exist if the baffle wall reaches the floor or the ceiling or if the interior blower unit barely protrudes into the container Smugglers have peeled back entire walls and replaced the insulation with contraband On occasion, small sections have been hollowed out and patched New rivets, calking, glue or wall material, creases where the wall was folded back, or a wavy or uneven wall might be evidence that it was altered to conceal contraband Floors in reefer containers are normally constructed of aluminium and are corrugated to allow for cool air circulation beneath the cargo Ceilings are insulated with four to six inches of insultation between the inner ceiling and the roof False floors and roofs may be detected by noticing telltale signs of tampering, variances in height, or uneven appearances TRAILERS Contraband is concealed in trailers in much the same manner as in containers False walls, roofs, ceilings, and floors are common Additionally, smugglers have routinely used the trailer undercarriage, air tanks, and tyres to conceal illegal drugs (Figure 5) Examinations of trailers should be systematic Beginning with the exterior, notice the condition of the metal and the rivets comprising the roof Normally, the roof should be flat and the rivets weatherworn A buckled appearance or new rivets may indicate that the roof has been altered to conceal illegal drugs Next, examine the undercarriage Often, smugglers working with conspirators aboard the vessel or involved in the unlading process will simply leave small packages of contraband in existing cracks and crevices in the framework of the undercarriage Tanks that supply air to the air brake system have often been disconnected and filled with contraband Tanks containing only air should give off a clear ringing sound when struck with a metallic object Tyres have also been used to conceal illegal drugs Normal tyre pressure is 80 pounds per square inch Underinflated tyres may conceal illegal drugs Detecting contraband in tyres can be accomplished by using the tap method Place the fingertips of one hand on the tyre tread and tap the opposite side of the tread with the other hand or with a blunt instrument A clear ringing vibration will be felt if the tyre contains only air If there is contraband present, there will be a dull thud and little vibration Other telltale signs of possible concealment in tyres include SECURITYAT SEA 93 fresh scratches on lug nuts, clean lug nuts on an otherwise dirty wheel, and fresh paint or grease on lug nuts by shifting cargo The ceiling may also be panelled False walls are common methods of smuggling in trailers A trailer is supported by two steel girders set three to four feet apart running underneath the floor from the rear doors to the front mounting plate A steel plate can be mounted from one girder to another, thus creating a compartment for contraband This space should normally be open, and the wooden floor of the trailer should be visible When examining a trailer's walls, be alert for the odour of new glue or caulking used to attach a false panel or to conceal an odour Also be alert for new rivets, screws, nails, or other fastening devices and for changes in size, colour, texture, or condition of wall panels One way to reveal a false wall is to measure and compare the interior and exterior lengths of the trailer Counting the spaces between the struts on the ceiling (each approximately two feet apart) can give a fairly accurate length A furniture van is a trailer with a notch cut out where the tractor hooks up Because of this notch, a platform is created which is raised off the floor approximately 12 inches and which runs approximately six feet from the front wall of the trailer Smugglers have been known to extend these platforms to create compartments in which to conceal contraband (Figure 6) When opening the doors of trailers to examine their interiors, be aware of any odours which may be present Confined areas combined with built-up heat can make the odour of some drugs quite noticeable Like containers, the floors, walls, and ceilings of trailers can be altered to conceal illegal drugs Many trailers have metal, wood, or fiberglass panels covering the interior walls which protect these walls from damage caused To detect an alteration in the floor of a trailer, compare the interior and exterior wood Do they match? Look for new sections of wood or steel and observe if the floor is abnormally elevated CHASSIS Concealment techniques used on container chassis are similar to those used on the undercarriages of trailers Air and other tanks provide ready compartments which can be used to conceal illegal drugs Tyres and cavities near the truck hook-up area are commonly used for concealment of illegal drugs ANNEX SPECIMEN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY (IMS) SHIP SECURITY PLAN CONTENTS LIST DESCRIPTION SECTION ONE-INTRODUCTION & SECURITY POLICY Section I I-Introduction Introduction Disclaim Section 1.2-0perator & Ship Details Operator Ship Details Section 1.3-Security Pol~cy Operator Security Officer Director Safety and Security Ship Security Officer Security Planning Port Security Assets Master Keys Key Control IMO Designated Restricted Areas Vulnerable Points Small Technical Lockers Access Points to the Ship Crew Identification Passes and Boarding Procedures Crew Safety Card Passenger Identification/Boarding Passes Visitors Passes and Boarding Procedures Shoreside Visitors Shore Based Staff Visitor Identification Log Stevedore Identification and Control Searching Procedures Crew Security Training Computer Security Drug Policy Skeet Guns and Ammunition Defensive Equipment Section 1.4-Alert State Measures Introd uction Access Control Screening Securing Searching the Ship SECURITY AT SEA 95 SECTION TWO-BOMB/SUSPICIOUS OBJECT SEARCH PLANS Section I-Guidance Section 2.2-Action Section 2.3-First on Action to be taken if a Bomb Warning is Received Introduction Receipt of the Initial Message Enclosures Bomb Threat Checklist Check Sheet One Check Sheet Two Port Announcement Check Sheet Three First Announcement-At Sea Second Announcement-At Sea Third Announcement-At Sea to be taken on Discovery of a Suspicious Object/Suspect Preamble Enclosures Check Sheet Four Check Sheet Five Suspicious Object/Suspect Bomb -Location & Description Form Check Sheet Six Check Sheet Seven Public Announcement Requesting Information Public Announcement Concluding the Incident Sweep-Control Sheets Introd uction Master Control Sheet Section 2.4-Stage One Search-Control Introd uction Control Sheets Sheets Section 2.5-Stage Two Search-Control Introduction, Control Sheets Sheets Section 2.6-Explosive Section 2.7-Blast 96 Device Analysis Route Planning THE NAUTICALINSTITUTE Bomb SECTION THREE-ASSISTANCE Section I-Duties & GUIDANCE NOTES of the Security Guards Purpose of Duties Duties at the Gangway Patrol Duties Duties at Sea Section 3.2-Reserved for future use Section 3.3-Example Orders for the Duty Watch Officer at the Gangway Section 3.4-Indicators Suspects to Assist in the Identification amongst Passengers of Section 3.5-Indicators to Assist in the Identification of Forged or Suspect Passport/Travel Documents Introduction, Phase One Phase Two Section 3.6-Notification of Suspicious Introduction Procedure Section 3.7-Report Section 3.8-Guidance Section 3.9-Indicators Section 3.10-Visitors Passengers Recommended Action on an Unlawful Act Ship or Port Area Description Brief Description of Incident or Threat Number of Alleged Offenders Method Used to Introduce Dangerous Substances or Devices into the Port Facility or Ship Type of Dangerous Substances or Devices Used What Measures and Procedures are Recommended to prevent a Recurrent Other Pertinent Details on Action to be Taken if the Ship is Taken Over by Force General Military Action Public/Press Information to Assist in the Identification of Forged US Dollars Record Sheet Introduction Retention of Visitors Record Sheets Specimen Visitors Record Sheet SECURITYAT SEA 97 SECTION FOUR-INVESTIGATIONS Section I-Incident Report Forms Introduction Statement Form Report Form-Personal Medical Form-Personal Letter of Indemnity Injury to a Passenger or Visitor Injury to a Passenger or Visitor SECTION FIVE-ANTI DRUG SMUGGLINGAND ABUSE PROTECTION Section I-Anti Section 5.2-Action Drug Smuggling Protective Measures when Drugs are Found at Sea Section 5.3-Indicators to Assist in the Identification Section 5.4-Guidelines for the Control of Alcohol on Board Ship 98 THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE of Drug Abuse ANNEX GUIDE TO SEARCHING PROCEDURES IN PORTS AND ON SHIPS General-Searching should be a team effort under the leadership of a supervisor who should be responsible for observing the passengers, allocating them to individual searchers, ensuring that the maximum duty times are not exceeded and for the supervision of in-depth searches, when these are considered necessary The supervisor should ensure that his team are not distracted from doing their jobs efficiently and be on the look out for the tricks that have been used in the past to avoid or defeat search Passenger Search Point-There are three options in selecting the position of the search point chosen for passengers and their hand carried baggage As every port is different the final judgment must be made by local management Each option has advantages and disadvantages which must be weighed up when selecting the best solution These options are:(a) Centralised Search Point-The biggest advantage of selecting one centralised search point is that it is generally more economical in terms of equipment; personnel and space Also control services such as Police, Customs and Immigration should be able to integrate easily into centralised search The principle disadvantage is that keeping the 'clean passengers' segregated after search will present problems of organisation and surveillance (b) Channel Search-In this system, generally applicable to busier search points are established in each of the passenger access routes ships It is more expensive in both manpower and equipment but has of having a faster rate of processing passengers Also control after be easier (c) ports, several to the ship or the advantage search should Gangway Search-Search at the gangway head is the final and least favoured option as it has the disadvantages of allowing the terrorists to get very close to the ultimate target Also space in ships will be at a premium compared with ashore, and long queues of passengers waiting on an open gangway to pass the search control may become irritable While this option cannot be a favourite it will be imperative in the following (i) circumstances: By passenger carrying vessels at all times screening ashore i.e In many foreign ports when there is no passenger (ii) By all ships when there is a high threat of terrorist attack to that ship or port when double screening of passengers should be done Indeed all personnel boarding ships should be searched in such circumstances Methods of Search-Passengers (a) and visitors to ships in high threat States may be searched physically by hand or subject to sweep by metal detectors Physical searching is best carried out in booths as privacy minimises embarrassment and increased effectiveness The use of booths also prevents search methods being observed However booths are expensive, take up valuable space and invite claims for assault Nevertheless a location where searches can be carried out in private should be available for those passengers or staff who request privacy and where indepth searches of those who arouse suspicion can be carried out, in the presence of a supervisor As an alternative, screens can be used to achieve some of the purposes of booths Passengers should not be given the opportunity of selcting a particular searcher, and rope stanchions or other barriers should be used to prevent searchers being crowded and distracted This enables the supervisor to observe the passengers, to note suspicious behaviour and to allocate passengers to available searchers to ensure no over-loading Physical Searching-Passengers SECURITY AT SEA 99 (b) Metal Detection-The most usual way of using metal detection is to process passengers and staff through an archway which is preset to alarm if a certain amount of metal is carried on the person Hand-held metal detectors may also be used for screening individual passengers and members of staff especially those few who object to physical search on religious or other grounds Irrespective of which equipment is used it is essential to remember that metal detectors will not pick up explosives, plastic weapons or inflammable liquids carried in glass or plastic containers on the person For this reason metal detection alone is insufficient and must always be accompanied by a physical search of a proportion of those being screened, including some who not alarm the detector This combination increases the chances of detection and acts as a powerful deterrent Baggage Screening-The baggage can be divided into two types: Bags hand carried by foot passengers, and heavy baggage for cruise liner passengers The smuggling of weapons and the planting of lED in baggage are methods well favoured by terrorists, and bombs have been planted in British-flag vessels this way Methods of screening both groups of baggage include:- Metal Detectors Vapour Detection probes and systems X-Ray Systems , Physical Search Dogs (a) Metal Detectors-Metal detectors are of little use for screening baggage and personal belongings since most bags and brief-cases have locks, hinges and other metal components which would result in a very high alarm rate Moreover handheld detectors have a limited depth of effective penetration (b) Vapour Detection-Air sampling system either static or hand-held can be used to detect some explosives However, currently no commercial system is capable of detecting all forms of explosives They can, however, be used to supplement other systems such as X-Ray (c) X-Ray Systems (i) The most usual method of screening baggage and personal belongings is to use X-Ray equipment and modern equipments are capable of producing images of good definition and penetration However, X-Ray examination can also be defeated; for example X-Rays may not detect explosives and plastic weapons nor will they allow identification of the actual liquid in bottles or other containers Morevover it is possible to camouflage the image of weapons and devices by the use of other dense materials, such as lead crystal glass The use of X-Ray equipment must therefore also be accompanied by a percentage physical check of baggage, including a proportion that not arouse suspiction (ii) The use of X-Rays is a very effective method of screening bags and other items provided certain conditions are met For example, operator efficiency decreases significantly after only a relatively short time, particularly at peak screening periods For this reason operators should only scan X-Ray images for a maximum of 20 minutes and then be employed on other duties, such as a physical search, for 40 minutes before returning to the console It is also essential that the image is presented for an adequate time to permit proper examination and a minimum of seconds is considered necessary for this Screening techniques will vary depending upon whether the equipment presents a fixed or scrolling (moving) image Either way it is necessary to ensure that the complete picture is checked and that any bag whose image arouses suspicion, or contains a dark area which could conceal a weapon or device, is rejected for physical search 100 THE NAUTICALINSTITUTE (d) Physical (i) Search To be properly effective, physical search of bags and belongings should include a check for false compartments, often used for the smuggling of weapons and devices Although false 'bottoms' are most usual, devices have been incorporated around the sides of cases, in the lids and in the compartments of holdalls Very often a smell of glue or a heavy odour to mask the smell or explosives is an indication that a lining may have been removed, a substance, such as explosive, placed behind it and the lining stuck back in position Attention should be paid to any tampering or repair to a case, non standard or unmatched case components, and also to greasy stains or small holes in the case exterior The contents of bags should be assessed during search and if the weight seems disproportionate, or the bag is unbalanced for no obvious reason, then a further check for a false compartment would be justified (iii) Particular attention should be paid to electrical and electronic apparatus, such as radios, which have often been used as containers for devices to avoid detection under X-Ray examination Passengers should be questioned on the origins of the equipment and whether it has been out of their possession for any period of time Equipment may be examined for unusual characteristics; signs of tampering, excessive weight, loose objects inside (rotate, not shake) X-Ray the equipment if suspicions are aroused Treat all new, packaged equipment in the same manner as used models (iii) Other containers carried in bags, which could be used to conceal weapons must also be examined Normally this can be done visually but gift-wrapped parcels, birthday cakes etc., can be screened by metal detectors or X-Ray (e) Use of Dogs-Specially trained dogs can be very effective in searching cars, baggage and freight However, they should normally not be used near groups of passengers as they tend to alarm people and are sometimes put off by them Dogs can also be used for searching in ships However, they need to be familiar with the seagoing environment to achieve results In fact to have their 'sea legs.' Heavy Baggage-The screening of heavy baggage is normally done by central X-Ray machine supported by physical search Air sampling probes can be used in the checking of heavy baggage and it is an area where the use of digs trained to sniff out explosives may well be beneficial Like passenger screening; once heavy baggage has been screened it is essential it should be marked and kept under surveillance until onboard the ship In the organisation and control of heavy baggage, the rules of reconciling passengers to their baggage must be strictly adhered to Cars and Small Vehicles-The screening of cars boarding ferries has two aims namely: (A) Preventing a car bomb being driven on-board (B) Intercepting (a) weapons, explosive and lED concealed in those cars Organisation-Port Management must decide where and how they can best screen cars and other small vehicles before they board the ferries This will depend upon the physical dimensions of the port area and the numbers of vehicles boarding each ship The principles of maintaining sterility and controlled contact laid out for passengers applies equally to cars Once the decision as to where and how screening should be done has been made, the methods of search must be decided As with baggage, dogs trained to sniff explosives can be used, but physical search is the most reliable method (b) Where random searching or percentage screening is in force the advice of Police should be sought in picking which car to search Customs will also be interested and can be consulted on selection They are both expert searchers and very knowledgeable on the habits of smugglers If possible a covered shed with nearby X-Ray equipment should be chosen so that suspect bags can be subjected to X-Ray examina tion SECURITY AT SEA 101 (c) On high risk routes all cars should be searched as they should when a specific threat arises to a port, ship or line The deterrent effect of regular searching of cars is considerable (d) Spot Searching in Ships-If shore screening is non-existent ships should spot search cars on-board if they are unable to this before boarding This is especially important during high threats, but should be practised at all times Car owners should accompany all such searches (e) Reconciliation of car and driver-In the same way as baggage; people from vehicles must never be allowed to land once their car or van is on-board Freight Vehicles and dumb trailers-The searching of freight trailers before boarding is notoriously difficult but measures must be taken to meet this problem Careful examination of paperwork and screening of drivers coupled with reaction to good intelligence goes some way to solving this problem Customs are closely concerned with freight and should be consulted In the future, developments in the field of air sampling systems may improve the ability to check freight In the final event trailers can be 'unstuffed' and physically searched using all methods mentioned above, including sniffer dogs Other Freight-Freight consigned to cargo vessels excluding bulk aggregates and liquids should be checked when the level demands and normally on a random basis However, the screening of freight presents problems because of the shape and size of many of the items Often freight is protected from damage by wooden crates and other forms of packing and the nature of some items such as large canisters or carboys containing schemicals, makes examination impossible Physical search or the use of XRays will seldom be possible although explosve vapour detectors can be used Ship's Stores-All ship's stores consigned to a ship offer a conduit for lED or smuggled weapons Ships must organise themselves to check their stores carefully and screen each ite when the threat level so demand Companies can helf their vessels by bulk consignment of designated ship's stores in sealed containers Miscellaneous Deliveries to Ships and Ports-Terrorists may well use innocent miscellaneous vehicles and people delivering routine items such as bread, milk, flowers or fresh vegetables to ports and ships Good access control, personnel ID and random search will help to counter this risk 102 THE NAUTICALINSTITUTE INDEX Achille Lauro 9, 11, 13, 17 Action 47 Action to be taken if the ship is taken over by force 36 Action when drugs are found at sea 42 Aims of piracy 52 Alert states 31 Annual ship security surveys 31 Anti drug smuggling protection measures 38 Application for designation of a restricted zone(s) within a harbour area 79 Assault 34 Aviation and Security Improvements Act-1991 24 Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) 25 Bomb search plan 33 City ofPoros 11, 17 Clothing 47 Commercial consideration 35 Contingency planning 78 Contingency plans 33 Control of access to sensitive areas on board ship 82 Control of embarkation and disembarkation 81 Darken ship 45 Definition of piracy 51 Designated authority 56 Directions under the UKAviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 78 Discipline of locking 31 Ditmas, H 25 Drug search 39 Drug search plan 33 Electronic silence 47 Engineering/electrical 47 Entry of people to the ship 29 Exchange of information 71 Explosion 49 Fallout 49 Ferry security 20,85 Firelighting/damage control 45 Good visual lookout 48 Governmental involvement 19 Guards 69 Guide to searching procedures in ports and on ships 99 Guidelines to Prevent Illegal Acts at Sea 20 Hijacker 36 Illegal drugs 38 IMOGuidelines 20, 56 IMOrestricted areas 31 Indicators to assist in the identification of drug abuse 42 Information gathering 28 Insurance and compensation 20 International Maritime Organization 22 Law enforcement personnel 71 Letter or parcel bombs 55 Lifeboats/lifesaving 45 Manslaughter 35 Master, safe 52 Measures to prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crews 22 Medical 46 Mine countermeasures 49 Moral responsibility 19 Murder 35,53 Navigation 48 Nuclear, biological and chemical attack 49 Operator 56 Operator security officer 27,28,56 Pass systems 80 Passenger and crew perception 19 Passenger terminal 56 29 PM~S Physical security measures 81, 83 Piracy 51 Port facility 56 Port facility security officer 56 Port security 28 Port security committee 78 Practical measures to improve maritime securi ty 27 Precautions 53 Radio 47 Reasonable measures 20 Refuse 47 Responsibility for security 78 Restricted zones 79 Sabotage 34 Santa Maria 11, 15 Sea carrier initiative programme 25 Sea carrier security manual drug smuggling in containers, trailers and chassis 89 Searches 39 Seaching 29 Searching in harbour areas 83,99 Security alarms and communication systems 66 Security measures and procedures 64 Security officer 27 Security planning and the establishment of an intelligence system 28 Security surveys 62 Security training 68 Ship security officer 27,56,70 Ship security plan 28, 56,95 Ship security personnel training 70 Ship's crew 71 Stowaway 36 Super carrier initiative programme 26 Terrorist recognition 28 ~~~m Terrorist attacks 13 Threat assessment 84 Threat assessment and action table 87 TIR rules 21 Training 32 Travel advisories 23 United Kingdom Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 24,78 United States 1986 Ports and Maritime Security Act 23,72 United States Anti-Drug Abuse Act 1986 25 US Coast Guard 24 Weapons 35 Zero tolerance 25 SECURITY AT SEA 103 NOTICE TO ALL READERS If you have experiences or information concerning security at sea which you believe could help others, please send your letter, report or comments to The Secretary The Nautical Institute so that they can be incorporated in a new edition of this book THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE The Nautical Institute is an international professional body for qualified mariners whose principal aim is to promote a high standard of knowledge, competence and qualifications amongst those in control of seagoing craft The Institute publishes a monthly journal SEA WAYS and is actively involved in promoting good operational practices as demonstrated by this book on Security at Sea Other projects and certificate schemes include The Nautical Institute on Command, The Work of The Nautical Surveyor, The Work of The Harbour Master, Pilotage, and Management There are now nearly 6000 members in seventy different countries and the requirements for full membership are a master's foreign-going certificate from a recognised administration or naval ship command qualifications For more information and an application form, write to, The Secretary, The Nautical Institute, 202 Lambeth Road, LONDONSE1 7LQ, or telephone 071-928 1351 104 THE NAUTICALINSTITUTE ... particularly in the United States and SECURITY AT SEA 19 United Kingdom, to pass maritime security legislation, and then to create special units to check to see that their legislation is being implemented... European rather than an Arab richer after the event.] SECURITY AT SEA 21 CHAPTER FOUR THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION'S GUIDELINES TO PREVENT ILLEGAL ACTS AT SEA AND SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION... is that, whereas there are a multitude of SaLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) regulations and laws of the sea concerning safety, there are no SaLAS or international laws of the sea dealing with security