Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) A radical and newly racialized anti-Semitism gained adherents in Germany and parts of central Europe in the 1920s The view of “the Jew” as not just religiously and socially different, but as racially distinct from and inferior to the “Volk,” fed directly into the rise and popular appeal of Nazism Race hatred conduced to an ultimately exterminationist ideology that in a more distant sense underlay the origins and conduct of World War II in Europe and led directly to the Holocaust Important arguments persist among historians about the essential connections between anti-Semitism and the extermination programs of the Nazis and others, such as the Uštaše In 1996 sociologist Daniel Goldhagen used the term “eliminationist” to characterize what he saw as the historical logic of German antiSemitism, which supposedly led inexorably into genocidal conclusions along a clear Sonderweg Other scholars strongly disagreed that the German variant was peculiarly or even especially eliminationist before Hitler and the Nazis turned it in that direction On specific forms, expressions, and instances of anti-Semitism see also Action Franỗaises; Algeria; America First Committee; Anschluss; Antonescu, Ion; Auschwitz; British Union of Fascists; Bulgaria; Einsatzgruppen; Einstein, Albert; fascism; genocide; ghettos; Iron Guard; Italian Army; Joyce, William; Nuremberg Laws; Palestine; Pius XI; Pius XII; Poland; Protocols of the Elders of Zion; Rumania; Schutzstaffel (SS); Sonderweg; Sovinformburo; Vatican; Wannsee conference; Warsaw Ghetto ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) All passive or active measures taken to defend against submarines The ASW doctrine of the main Western Allied navies was well-advanced by the end of World War I, but lapsed badly during the interwar years Instead of building large flotillas of smaller escort ships, the Royal Navy reverted to construction of capital warships such as battleships and cruisers, and discredited and failed to practice often or well necessary anti-submarine escort drills The Admiralty also failed to prevent successive peacetime governments from adopting and following a highly damaging “Ten Year Rule” in annual budgets: the assumption that Britain would not engage in a naval war in the next 10 years, rolled over year after year Cuts led to elimination of the Anti-Submarine and Trade (convoy support) Divisions and sharp curtailment of scientific research Fortunately, some research continued on underwater detection systems It culminated in a technological breakthrough that led to ASDIC, which proved critical to ultimate Royal Navy success in the war against the U-boats For all those reasons, the main ASW technique employed by British and Commonwealth navies at the outset of the war was passive: to steam vulnerable cargo, tanker, and troopships in convoy, though even that tactic was opposed by some important naval officers For a number of months the Admiralty quite wishfully thought that fast single ships (“independents”) could avoid U-boats by running blacked-out and with zigzag navigation So-called fast merchantmen were therefore not forced into “slow convoys” early in the Battle of the Atlantic Another passive technique was routing convoys around known U-boat positions and picket lines, a measure greatly aided by ULTRA reading of Kriegsmarine signals intercepts It became clear that passive tactics would not suffice as sinkings 53